The Powers of the Presidency of the Council of the EU to Shape the Rule of Law Enforcement Agenda: The Article 7 Case

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Abstract

Research on enforcing compliance with the European Union's (EU's) rule of law value has focused on the roles of the European Commission, the European Parliament and the Court of Justice of the EU. However, the Council of the EU has attracted less attention. Existing scholarship has convincingly established that the rotating Presidency can crucially influence the functioning of the Council, and, accordingly, this paper examines the discretionary impact the Presidencies have towards Art.7 procedures. Drawing on official documents and statements, this paper compares how the various Presidencies from 2018 to 2022 have used their privileged position on the Council's agenda to decide whether to move forward with hearings. In doing so, they selected appropriate agenda-shaping strategies, shaped the Commission's perceived opportunities to exercise its agenda prerogatives, avoided compromises on the trios' agendas and, sometimes, benefited from not dealing with Art.7 to pursue other agenda priorities. The Presidency's wide room for manoeuvre hinders the Council's activity in scrutinising backsliding governments.

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Hernández, G. (2024). The Powers of the Presidency of the Council of the EU to Shape the Rule of Law Enforcement Agenda: The Article 7 Case. Journal of Common Market Studies, 62(5), 1159–1176. https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.13551

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