Rorty on hermeneutical injustice, liberal redescription and utopian imagination

Abstract

My purpose is to use Miranda Frickers' concepts of "testimonial injustice" and "hermeneutical injustice" to draw a distinction between the policy of tolerance and the policy of solidarity in Rortyan liberalism. I shall focus on the policy of solidarity interpreted as unfolding in two phases of the imagination: the phase of critical imagination and the phase of utopian imagination. I hold that critical imagination may be understood as focusing on overcoming hermeneutical injustice through what I term liberal redescription. Lastly, I critique the Rortyan project regarding what I view as an inadequate inclination to restrict critical imagination on the basis of adopting a criterion that focuses on flaws in the development of utopian imagination and that collides with the claim to overcome hermeneutical injustice.