Equivalence-based Security for Querying Encrypted Databases: Theory and Application to Privacy Policy Audits

Abstract

To reduce costs, organizations may outsource data storage and data processing to third-party clouds. This raises confidentiality concerns, since the outsourced data may have sensitive information. Although semantically secure encryption of the data prior to outsourcing alleviates these concerns, it also renders the outsourced data useless for any relational processing. Motivated by this problem, we present two database encryption schemes that reveal just enough information about structured data to support a wide-range of relational queries. Our main contribution is a definition and proof of security for the two schemes. This definition captures confidentiality offered by the schemes using a novel notion of equivalence of databases from the adversary's perspective. As a specific application, we adapt an existing algorithm for finding violations of a rich class of privacy policies to run on logs encrypted under our schemes and observe low to moderate overheads.