Gadamer, Descartes, and the Problem of Method

Abstract

In this paper, I demonstrate that, beyond the notion of prejudice, it is the whole Cartesian framework that Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics seems to reject in Truth and Method. I buttress this argument by addressing a gamut of central concepts, namely doubt, evidence, history, life, subjectivity, language, and, most importantly, method itself. In the course of the discussion, I emphasize many fine details of Gadamer’s approach to Cartesianism. I further ask whether Gadamer really succeeds in disentangling himself from a methodical demand that is fundamental for Descartes but that he also underscores in the works of other philosophers, such as Hegel and Heidegger. I suggest that Cartesianism thus appears enlightening to point out the complexities of Gadamer’s hermeneutics.