Adapting to Multipolarity: Insights from Iterated Game Theory Simulations—A Preliminary Study on Hypothetical Optimal Global Cooperation

Abstract

The global geopolitical landscape is characterized by the rise of new powers and a shift toward multipolarity. This study examines the impact of multipolarity on international cooperation using an iterated game theory approach, particularly the classic prisoner’s dilemma, extended to a multiplayer setting. This effort can be regarded as a preliminary study of hypothetical optimal global cooperation. The main hypothesis is that an increase in the number of large countries in the international system will lead to higher levels of cooperation. Our simulation approach confirmed this. Our findings extend to the conclusion that multipolarity, under appropriate cultural and value systems, can foster new economic development and fair competition. Furthermore, we emphasize the importance of evolving strategies and cooperative dynamics in a multipolar world, contributing to discussions on foreign economic policy integration, sustainability, and managing vulnerabilities among great powers. The study underscores the necessity of strategic frameworks and international institutions in promoting global stability and cooperation amidst the complexities of multipolarity.