FREE RIDERS AND COLLECTIVE ACTION: AN APPENDIX TO THEORIES OF ECONOMIC REGULATION.

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Abstract

The free rider problem is restated more precisely as the cheap rider problem. It is argued that it takes account of the frequent or typical asymmetry in the interests of different enterprises an industry, the individual incentives of many enterprises to participate in joint ventures are substantial.

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Stigler, G. J. (1974). FREE RIDERS AND COLLECTIVE ACTION: AN APPENDIX TO THEORIES OF ECONOMIC REGULATION. Bell J Econ Manage Sci, 5(2), 359–365. https://doi.org/10.2307/3003114

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