Abstract
According to Martha Nussbaum, objectification is essentially a form of instrumentalization or use. I argue that this instrumentalization account fails to capture the distinctive harms and wrongs of sexual objectification, because it does not explain the relationship between instrumentalization and the processes of social stereotyping that make it possible. I develop an imposition account of sexual objectification that provides such an explanation and, therefore, should be preferred over the instrumentalization account. It draws on a contrast between imposition and self-presentation and explains why sexual objectification, understood as the imposition of sex object status on women, is harmful and wrong.
Cite
CITATION STYLE
Jütten, T. (2016). Sexual objectification. Ethics, 127(1), 27–49. https://doi.org/10.1086/687331
Register to see more suggestions
Mendeley helps you to discover research relevant for your work.