Community-led water utility governance and corruption: the case of Faisalabad, Pakistan

Abstract

The provision of clean, on-premises, and on-demand water to households is a big challenge in rapidly growing Global South cities. Participatory and community-based approaches to public goods provision have emerged as promising water governance modes to address this challenge. This study focuses on state-reinforced self-governance (SRSG), an innovative institutional mechanism that promotes self-governance at the local level. We evaluate the governance structure that supports the development of a community-led piped water utility, specifically the processes involved in providing household piped water connections to residents in Faisalabad, Pakistan. These connections share characteristics of a common-pool resource, being non-exclusive and rival. Based on SRSG design principles in combination with Ostrom’s three collective action puzzles, we identify weaknesses in the institutions meant to promote self-governance. Our findings show that all actors involved in water service provision collaborated effectively to build the water infrastructure. However, corruption hindered their cooperation when the community-based organization assumed control and began providing household piped water connections. Guided by Elinor Ostrom’s design principles, we recommend establishing collective choice arrangements, monitoring, sanctioning, and conflict resolution mechanisms to foster cooperation among actors. These measures are crucial for ensuring the effective delivery and long-term stability of the community-led piped water service.