Abstract
A zero-knowledge proof of training (zkPoT) enables a party to prove that they have correctly trained a committed model based on a committed dataset without revealing any additional information about the model or the dataset. An ideal zkPoT should offer provable security and privacy guarantees, succinct proof size and verifier runtime, and practical prover efficiency. In this work, we present Kaizen, a zkPoT targeted for deep neural networks (DNNs) that achieves all these goals at once. Our construction enables a prover to iteratively train their model via (mini-batch) gradient descent, where the number of iterations need not be fixed in advance; at the end of each iteration, the prover generates a commitment to the trained model parameters attached with a succinct zkPoT, attesting to the correctness of the executed iterations. The proof size and verifier time are independent of the number of iterations. Our construction relies on two building blocks. First, we propose an optimized GKR-style (sumcheck-based) proof system for the gradient-descent algorithm with concretely efficient prover cost; this allows the prover to generate a proof for each iteration. We then show how to recursively compose these proofs across multiple iterations to attain succinctness. As of independent interest, we propose a generic framework for efficient recursive composition of GKR-style proofs, along with aggregatable polynomial commitments. Benchmarks indicate that Kaizen can handle the training of complex models such as VGG-11 with 10 million parameters and batch size 16. The prover runtime is 15 minutes per iteration, which is 24× faster than generic recursive proofs, with prover memory overhead 27× lower. The proof size is 1.63 megabytes, and the verifier runtime is only 130 milliseconds, where both are independent of the number of iterations and the size of the dataset.
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CITATION STYLE
Abbaszadeh, K., Katz, J., Pappas, C., & Papadopoulos, D. (2024). Zero-Knowledge Proofs of Training for Deep Neural Networks. In CCS 2024 - Proceedings of the 2024 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (pp. 4316–4330). Association for Computing Machinery, Inc. https://doi.org/10.1145/3658644.3670316
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