An individual manipulability of positional voting rules

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Abstract

We study a problem of individual manipulation in an impartial culture (IC) framework using computer modeling. We estimate the degree of manipulability of ten positional voting rules in the case of multiple choice for 3 and 4 alternatives. © 2011 The Author(s).

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Aleskerov, F., Karabekyan, D., Sanver, M. R., & Yakuba, V. (2011). An individual manipulability of positional voting rules. SERIEs, 2(4), 431–446. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13209-011-0050-y

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