Abstract
HOW WE BECOME AWARE OF PHYSICAL OBJECTS OVER AND ABOVE THEPERCEPTUAL ACTS OF SEEING COLOR, SHAPES AND HEARING SOUNDS,ETC., IS A QUESTION THAT HAS OCCUPIED MANY CONTEMPORARYPHILOSOPHERS OF SENSE-PERCEPTION. DID ARISTOTLE EVER FACETHIS PROBLEM, AND IF HE DID, HOW DID HE DEAL WITH IT? THISARTICLE DISCUSSES THIS QUESTION AND CONCLUDES THAT THEANSWER TO IT CAN BE FOUND "DE INSOMNIAS" IN ARISTOTLE'SDISCUSSION OF DREAMS AND ILLUSIONS. THERE IS AN ACTAFFIRMATION ("PHESIN") CARRIED OUT BY THE CONTROLLING ANDDISCRIMINATING SENSE ("TO KURION KAI TO EPIKRINON") WHICHDOES THIS. "FOR, SPEAKING GENERALLY, THE CONTROLLING POWER("ERXE") AFFIRMS ("PHESIN") THE REPORT GIVEN BY EACH SENSEUNLESS SOME MORE AUTHORITATIVE POWER CONTRADICTS IT."
Cite
CITATION STYLE
Block, I. (1960). Aristotle and the Physical Object. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 21(1), 93. https://doi.org/10.2307/2104791
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