The Divisional Game: Using Procedural Rights to Impede Generic/Biosimilar Market Entry

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Abstract

Despite being used frequently by practitioners in a wide array of technical fields, divisional patent applications (“divisionals”) seldom attract scholarly attention. The lack of scholarly attention is an error, particularly in the pharmaceutical field. Recent case law in the UK reveals that after generic/biosimilar manufacturers successfully revoke patents standing in the way of market entry, divisionals claiming protection for similar subject-matter as the patent that has just been revoked can crop up, hindering generic/biosimilar medicines from entering the market. Moreover, right before or after proceedings start, rightsholders de-designate countries to avoid a negative judgment that may affect a court elsewhere, meaning generic/biosimilar manufacturers initiated legal proceedings for nothing. Such practices demonstrate that divisionals deserve our attention. This article thus fills the scholarly gap by showing how divisionals are (mis)used in practice, before arguing that patent reform is necessary to prevent this from occurring.

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APA

Foss-Solbrekk, K. (2022). The Divisional Game: Using Procedural Rights to Impede Generic/Biosimilar Market Entry. IIC International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law, 53(7), 1007–1037. https://doi.org/10.1007/s40319-022-01225-3

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