Revisiting the economic theory of crime A state-level analysis in India

Abstract

The economic theory of crime tends to suggest that deterrence variables have a significant impact on crime rates in a society. From an economic perspective, criminals are rational economic agents who weigh the likelihood of being arrested and apprehended before committing a crime. An increase in the likelihood of arrest and apprehension should deter criminals as it increases the expected costs of committing crimes. This paper revisits the behavioral links between deterrence variables and crime rates in the Indian context. Empirically, we draw on state level data for India in 2001–2014 and employ the system GMM estimator technique to support our claims. The study reports that deterrence factors (probability of arrest and apprehension) have a perverse impact on India’s crime rates. The paper reveals that an increase in the probability of deterrence variables does not lead to a reduction in crime rates, indicating a fundamental flaw in India’s corrective mechanisms. The research recommends penal system reform in order to accurately reconfigure the behavioral links between deterrence variables and crime rates.