Does Information Asymmetry Affect Firm Disclosure? Evidence from Mergers and Acquisitions of Financial Institutions

Abstract

We use a quasi-exogenous shock to information asymmetry among shareholders to evaluate the effect of information asymmetry on corporate disclosure. In the post-Regulation Fair Disclosure (FD) period, the merger between a shareholder and a lender of the same firm provides a shock to the information asymmetry among equity investors, because Regulation FD applies to shareholders but not lenders. After the merger, the shareholder gains access to the firm-specific private information held by the lender, which produces an asymmetry in the information held by shareholders. We first provide evidence that information asymmetry among shareholders indeed increases after the shareholder–lender mergers. We then use a difference-in-differences research design to show that after shareholder–lender merger transactions, firms issue more quarterly forecasts (including earnings, sales, capital expenditure, earnings before interest, taxes, amortization (EBITDA), and gross margin), and the quarterly earnings forecasts are more precise. This study provides direct empirical evidence that information asymmetry among shareholders affects corporate disclosure. Firms can address increased information asymmetry by providing more disclosures, fostering a more equitable information environment. Additionally, policymakers might consider these results when evaluating the implications of Regulation FD, particularly in the context of mergers and acquisitions (M&A) of financial institutions where a shareholder gains access to private information held by a debt holder.