Alliance politics and national arms industries: creating incentives for small states?

Abstract

This article explores the effects of asymmetric alliances on states’ decisions to develop an arms industry. It conceptualises two types of asymmetric alliances: coercive asymmetric alliances and liberal asymmetric alliances and discusses their consequences for national decisions to build an arms industrial capability. Empirically, we analyse how the change in the alliance system (moving from the Warsaw Pact to NATO) affected the arms industry in small states, using the examples of Czechia and Estonia. We find that in a coercive asymmetric alliance, such as the Warsaw Pact, small states have little to no say about their arms industry. However, the trajectories of Czechian and Estonian arms industry after 1990 cannot be explained by NATO membership alone, since it is interwoven with other mechanisms coming into play. In particular, the EU may play an increasingly prominent role in shaping the future of arms industries in smaller states.