Coercion, copy-cats, and colleagues: Staffing the board of the ipo company

Abstract

122 initial public offerings (IPOs) occurring on the Stockholm Stock Exchange from January 1996 until September 2006 have been examined to assess the impact of institutional isomorphism on the selection of directors for boards facing the transition to listed companies. A high level of union representation as well as the restructuring of boards prior to an IPO and in anticipation of legal changes gives strong support for the influence of coercive isomorphism on IPO firms. Companies within industry sectors make similar choices with regard to their directors, their choices being dissimilar from their associates in other industry groupings. This supports the concepts underlying mimetic isomorphism. Finally normative isomorphism is largely supported by the reliance of corporations on a closed group of directors with similar educational backgrounds. All in all, societal and regulatory pressures, as modelled under institutional theory, are influencing the processes of corporate governance during an IPO.