Abstract
The idea of epistemic temperance is introduced and explicated through a discussion of Plato's understanding of it. A variety of psychological and epistemic phenomena (including confirmation bias, self-serving bias, etc.) are presented which arise due to epistemic intemperance, or the inappropriate influence of conations on cognition. Two cases familiar to philosophers, self-deception and racial prejudice, are discussed as the result of epistemic intemperance though they are not typically seen as having a common cause. Finally, epistemic temperance is distinguished from epistemic justice, as these have been conflated.
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CITATION STYLE
Bloomfield, P. (2019). Epistemic temperance. American Philosophical Quarterly, 56(2), 109–124. https://doi.org/10.2307/48570832
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