Union power and the green automotive transition: comparing bargaining episodes in the US and Germany, 2023–2024

Abstract

This article contributes to the debate on union efforts to shape decarbonisation of their industries by examining collective bargaining that impacted the transition to electric vehicles (EVs) in the auto industry. We compare the 2023 bargaining round between the United Auto Workers and the Detroit Three car makers in the US with the 2024 negotiations between IG Metall and Volkswagen in Germany. Both unions launched strikes, but while the UAW secured strong gains, IG Metall made major concessions. Applying power resource theory, we examine the two bargaining rounds to find explanations. The greater associational and institutional power of IG Metall conferred no advantage; equally, the UAW’s militant strategy alone does not explain its success. Rather, the outcomes were critically shaped by how the unions’ structural power – their ability to disrupt production and market exchange – was conditioned by two external factors: EV market volatility and high-level political support for the ‘green’ transition.