Abstract
We present a countermeasure for protecting modular exponentiations against side-channel attacks such as power, timing or cache analysis. Our countermeasure is well-suited for tamper-resistant implementations of RSA or DSA, without significant penalty in terms of speed compared to commonly implemented methods. Thanks to its high efficiency and flexibility, our method can be implemented on various platforms, from smartcards with low-end processors to high-performance servers. © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2006.
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CITATION STYLE
Vuillaume, C., & Okeya, K. (2006). Flexible exponentiation with resistance to side channel attacks. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 3989 LNCS, pp. 268–283). Springer Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/11767480_18
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