Two schemas for metaphysical emergence

Abstract

Wilson presents the problem of higher-level causation (Kim 1989, 1993, 1998), according to which metaphysical emergence gives rise to problematic causal overdetermination. She argues that there are two and only two strategies of response to this problem of making sense of metaphysical emergence. One strategy provides a schematic basis for ‘Weak’ (physically acceptable) emergence; core and crucial here is that a macro-entity or feature has a proper subset of the powers of its base-level configuration. The other strategy provides a schematic basis for ‘Strong’ (physically unacceptable) emergence; core and crucial here is that a macro-entity or feature has a new power as compared to its base-level configuration. Wilson shows that a range of seemingly diverse accounts of metaphysical emergence are plausibly seen as satisfying the conditions in one or the other schema, and thus are more unified than they appear.