Bureaucratic accountability: enabler or barrier for algorithm use?

Abstract

This article examines the impact of bureaucratic accountability structures on public servants’ attitudes toward algorithmic decision-making systems (ADS) in public administration, particularly within the under-researched context of the Global South. It employs accountability theory and algorithm aversion theory to explore how internal organizational accountability influences the adoption of technology in governance. The main question, “How do bureaucratic accountability structures affect public servants’ disposition toward algorithm use?” is investigated through a case study at the Chilean Instituto de Previsión Social (IPS). Findings indicate that well-defined accountability structures can significantly enhance trust in ADS, leading public officials to favor algorithmic decisions due to their perceived reliability and clarity in role responsibilities. With this, the article contributes to an under-researched dimension by linking accountability structures with technology adoption in public administrations, offering insights that could help shape organizational and policy frameworks for integrating ADS more effectively in governance settings.