Poster: False data injection attacks against contingency analysis in power grids

Abstract

Smart grid provides efficient and cost-effective management of the electric energy grid by allowing real-time monitoring, coordinating, and controlling of the system using communication networks between physical components. This inherent complexity significantly increases the vulnerabilities and attack surface in smart grid due to misconfigurations or the lack of security hardening. Therefore, it is important to ensure secure and resilient operation of smart grid by proactive identification of potential threats, impact assessment, and cost-efficient mitigation planning. This paper aims to achieve these goals through the development of an efficient security framework for the Energy Management System (EMS), a core smart grid component. In this paper, we present a framework that combines formal analytic with PowerWorld simulator which verifies the solution model to investigate the feasibility of false data injection attacks against contingency analysis in power grid. We evaluate the impact of such attacks by running experiments using synthetic data on the standard IEEE test cases.