The Futility of Force and the Preservation of Power: British Strategic Failure in America, 1780-83

Abstract

This article uses an abbreviated examination of the Southern Campaign (1780-82) to explore the principal causes of British strategic failure in the War for American Independence. In a conflict full of dubious assumptions and missed opportunities, the pinnacle of British political and strategic miscalculation occurred in the South. Though overshadowed by the dramatic events at Yorktown, the consistent and simultaneous application of both regular and irregular warfare during the Southern Campaign proved decisive. It, more than anything else, broke the political will of the loyalists in the region, helped wrest control of the Southern Colonies away from the British, and contributed, in no small way, to Britain's eventual decision to abandon the war altogether. American success was slowly sequestered, not seized, by Major General Nathanael Greene's astute integration of conventional and unconventional forces in pursuit of a definitive political, not military, victory.