Abstract
Ad reservation market is an important part of the Internet advertising industry. Advertisers expect to reserve ad slots in advance, while auctioneers need a mechanism for allocating ad slots and maximizing profits. We propose SMAR, which is a Strategy-proof Model-based online Auction for ad Reservation, to meet their needs. SMAR allows the cancelation policy. It means auctioneers can revoke the reservation and resell ad slots to advertisers with higher bids. SMAR achieves both incentive compatibility and individual rationality. We implement SMAR and compare it with offline VCG and other related works. The results show SMAR has a better performance in both social welfare and revenue.
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Li, Q., Wu, F., & Chen, G. (2019). A strategy-proof model-based online auction for ad reservation. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 11670 LNAI, pp. 612–617). Springer Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-29908-8_48
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