Tripartite Evolutionary Game Analysis of Stakeholder Decision-Making Behavior in Energy-Efficient Retrofitting of Office Buildings

Abstract

Environmental degradation is significantly influenced by the construction industry. Energy-efficient retrofitting of existing office buildings has become an effective means of reducing building energy consumption. Implementation of retrofits requires the support and cooperation of stakeholders. However, existing studies on the dynamics of decision-making behavior among stakeholders are still relatively limited. This study constructed a tripartite evolutionary game model including the government, property owners, and end users, to better understand the behavioral evolution and evolutionary stabilization strategies of stakeholders. The results show that: stakeholders’ decision-making behavior has obvious mutual influence; benefits and costs are the dominant factors in stakeholders’ decision making; the effects of government supervision policies depend on the profitability of the project; and government behavior appears to be influenced by public willingness. In addition, targeted countermeasures were proposed for the development of the energy-efficiency retrofit market. This study provides a generic model that fits various contexts and can be used to inform a reference for scientific decision making by stakeholders.