The nuclear taboo: The United States and the normative basis of nuclear non-use

Abstract

A normative element - a "nuclear taboo" - must be taken into account in explaining why the United States has not used nuclear weapons since 1945. Realists would deny that a taboo exists or that it can be identified separately from the behavioral pattern of non-use or the material interests of the actors and therefore has any independent analytical leverage. In contrast, I show that an explanation involving a normative element is a better explanation for nuclear non-use than a purely materialist one. I identify three effects of norms - regulative, constitutive, and permissive - and show in four cases how a taboo has played a role in constraining U.S. resort to nuclear weapons. This research challenges a narrow "deterrence" explanation of non-use and shows that norms constrain military capabilities and thus the practice of self-help in the international system.