Power-Sharing and the Paradox of Federalism: Federalization and the Evolution of Ethno-Territorial Conflict in the Case of Belgium (1979–2018)

Abstract

Does federalism fuel tensions in divided states? This paper addresses this question from a power-sharing angle. It provides a longitudinal analysis of the evolution of ethno-territorial conflict during five waves of federalization in a least-likely case: Belgium (1979–2018). Two original datasets on all cabinet conflicts (N = 1013; N = 328) provide an unprecedented picture of ethno-territorial conflict’s intensity, nature, and frequency (absolute/relative). All indicators forcefully contradict the paradox thesis. Conflict did not increase. If anything, there is a tentative decline. Exposing intra-segmental and segmentally mixed conflicts, this study also challenges conventional views on factors like bipolarity and the repercussions of split party systems.