Values and control of agency problems in family businesses

Abstract

Introduction: This study seeks to conceptualize and contextualize the values and relationships between principal and agent in family businesses. The theoretical foundation is drawn from the theory of agency and related empirical studies. Objective: Analyze the relationship of values and the control of agency problems between principals and agents united by a family link. Materials and methods: These are qualitative and seek to explain the hypothesis formulated. The treatment of the data was made from game theory, proposal of implementations, and design of mechanisms. The in-depth interview was used as a main research technique, preceded by a descriptive analysis with data previously collected. The data collection was oriented to obtain the perspectives and the points of view of the participants. The data analysis was performed using the ATLAS. ti software. Results: On the one hand, the results allowed to identify the family values transmitted from parents to children and how they become implicit agreements on how to manage the family's actions and their relationship with the company. On the other, the results allowed to accept the hypothesis formulated. Conclusion: Values were determined to be an important variable in the reduction of moral risk and adverse selection in the control of agency problems, as well as the existence of the market as the intervening external principal and its contribution to consolidate family businesses, to the extent in which there may be multiple principals and agents.