Resource Competition in Blockchain Networks Under Cloud and Device Enabled Participation

Abstract

Blockchain technology is a promising resource management architecture due to its ability of building trust in a decentralized transaction. Block mining participants, i.e. miners, are incentivized with reward for successfully mining blocks. Unfortunately, solving the proof-of-work puzzle consumes substantial computing powers during the mining period, which greatly challenges miners. Mobile devices also fail to participate in mining because of limited resource. To solve these issues, we are motivated to propose a mining framework of alleviating miner's computation-intensive mining burdens, as well as enabling mobile devices' participation. Depending on the proposed model, miners are capable of offloading their computation-intensive tasks to the edge cloud and mobile devices. The interactions among them formulate a muti-leader multi-follower Stackelberg game. We achieve the Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (SPE) in the game, which guarantees three types of participants to realize profit maximization. Simulation results demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed model.