Federalism and institutional design: The perils and politics of a triple-e senate in Canada

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Abstract

Since the proposal was put forward by a subcommittee of the Alberta legislature, most western Canadian political leaders have advocated a U.S.-style Triple-E (elected, effective, and equal) Senate. Superficially compatible with western Canada's stated constitutional and public policy agenda, the Triple-E proposal has broad elite and popular appeal in the West. However, such an institution will be unlikely to satisfy western demands for more effective representation in the federal Parliament, and will prove antithetical to another key western objective: significant reduction of public spending in Ottawa. Instead of pursuing a Triple-E Senate, the West's constitutional and policy objectives could focus on seeking greater devolution of power to the provinces. Such a strategy would have the added advantage of facilitating a constitutional alliance with the province of Quebec, thereby enhancing the likelihood of success. © 1995, CSF Associates.

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Lusztig, M. (1995). Federalism and institutional design: The perils and politics of a triple-e senate in Canada. Publius, 25(1), 35–50. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordjournals.pubjof.a038180

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