A gloss on attribution theory

Abstract

This paper consists of a critical examination of specific assumptions made by attribution theory about everyday epistemology. The first and main stipulation discussed concerns the model of man contained in attribution theory which is derived from a model of a statistician or a raw data processor. It is argued that this model poses considerable difficulty in explaining how everyday life is interpreted and understood, since it disregards the social context in which interpretation and understanding takes place. Further, it is argued that the model imputes assumptions of rationality to everyday life similar to those of a rational statistician. With this assumption attribution theory verges on ideology in its interpretation of everyday explanations of events. Finally, two further themes are addressed. The former, the twofold cause classification of explanation into situational and dispositional, is critically assessed. The latter concerns a serious shortcoming of attribution theory, namely its lack in specifying the conditions under which attributions are made in everyday life and those under which no attribution is made. In the concluding section the implications of these criticisms are then discussed.