Ambiguity in Plant Cognition

Abstract

Philosophers have suggested that plants are cognitive agents, sparking an intense debate across theoretical and empirical perspectives. Some critics argue that plants lack the necessary abilities to be cognitive and claim that “cognitive” is not literal in plant cognition. This paper does not assert that plants are cognitive agents but urges philosophers to adopt an unambiguous terminology in plant cognition. This work explores plant cognition from a philosophical perspective, highlighting its indisputable significance for biosemiotics. Plants are either cognitive agents or not cognitive. Here, I recommend abandoning vague terms like "cognitive-like" when describing plant abilities and behaviors. The first section of this work explores plant cognitive sciences and proposes a discussion around cognition. The second section addresses two issues: interpreting plant cognitive behaviors according to the anthropogenic approach to cognition and the anthropocentric and zoocentric tension in plant cognition. I provide empirical evidence of plants’ cognitive behaviors, such as perception, communication, and decision-making, and discuss critical issues. In the third section, I argue that “cognitive-like” perpetuates an anthropocentric view of plant cognition. This terminology creates a biased framework that hinders a proper understanding of plant behaviors.