Centripetalism in Consociational Democracy: The Multiple Proportional Vote and the Belgian Case

Abstract

Belgium illustrates that using consociational institutions in divided societies may ensure a peaceful political environment, but it fails in reducing its centrifugal tendencies. As communitarian issues threaten to paralyse the political debate, preserving the efficiency of the state will require adding centripetal incentives to the consociational framework. However, the solution usually proposed for this purpose –the creation of a federal constituency– would be insufficient and would raise legitimacy problems analogous to those occurred in Bosnia, the Swiss Canton of Berne or Cyprus. Instead, this paper advocates the adoption of a new electoral system: the Multiple Proportional Vote (MPV). MPV can maintain the consociational goal of including the different communities in the parliament, as well as to strengthen the centripetal trends towards moderation. Indeed, electors of every group are allowed to cast their preferences for candidates of the other communities. As such, MPV suggests that consociationalism and its main theoretical alternative, centripetalism, are far from mutually exclusive.