Championing the ‘German model’? Germany’s consistent preferences on the integration of fiscal constraints

Abstract

This article traces whether and how Germany’s preferences on the integration of fiscal constraints have evolved since the founding of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). Focusing on state elites and mass publics as driving forces of government preferences, the article also examines what has shaped German preferences since the Treaty of Maastricht. The article finds that elites welcomed the benefits of a single currency but feared the risks of high inflation and liability for other countries. Moreover, public scepticism about the euro translated into a ‘constraining dissensus’ regarding capacity-building in EMU. In line with these concerns, the German government sought to integrate fiscal constraints while leaving budgetary capacities at the national level. Thus, Germany adopted an instrumental approach to secure the success of the ‘German model’. While Germany’s preferences have remained largely the same since the founding of EMU, the strategies to realize them have changed over the years.