Regulatory Effect on Information Sharing of Industrial Internet Platforms Based on Three Differentiated Game Scenarios

Abstract

This study constructs a regulatory system for information sharing on industrial internet platforms from a technical and socio-legal perspective. A differentiated game is used to construct decentralized, centralized, and cost-sharing contract decision-making scenarios to obtain the optimal level of efforts for information-sharing regulation. Through a comparative analysis, the optimal solutions under the three scenarios were derived. These solutions were then analyzed through numerical simulations using Matlab2016a. Our research demonstrates the following: (1) Centralized decision-making is most beneficial to the development of information-sharing regulatory systems. (2) Beyond a critical value for the local government cost subsidy coefficients, changes in these coefficients have a more pronounced effect on improving the economic efficiency of the regulatory system, and vice versa. That is, when the cost subsidy coefficient is higher than 1/2, increasing the cost subsidy coefficient has a more pronounced effect on improving the economic efficiency of the information-sharing regulatory system. (3) In all scenarios, an increase in the regulatory effort can effectively enhance the reputation of the information-sharing regulatory system. This study further extends the research on information-sharing regulations and provides a practical guide to industrial internet platforms.