El movimiento de la existencia: posibilidades y límites de la descripción fenomenológica de la corporeidad.

Abstract

This paper presents phenomenology from the point of view of Maurice Merleau Ponty. Two arguments are developed: Merleau-Ponty�s aim is opposed to the psychologist theories that reduce perception to pure sensation, that is to say, to the apprehension of isolated sensual information. In contrast, we want to demonstrate that Merleau-Ponty understands perception as the interpretation of an horizon of meanings and perspectives that leads to correlations between subject and object. In strict sense, to perceive is to understand that the object shows itself in areas of meaning that leads to its constitution between subject and object. This thesis will have as immediate consequence that the gap between subject and object disappears. Besides that, the double aspect of perception becomes evident. Perspective (structure, object and horizon) allows one to experience objects not as mere isolated information, but as a horizon, that is to say, as fields of meaning. Secondly, it will be necessary to approach Merleau-Ponty�s critiques to the theories about the body whose more radical position has led to its own objectification, that is to say, to the reduction of embodiment to just one thing