Abstract
In all existing efficient proofs of knowledge of a solution to the infinity norm Inhomogeneous Small Integer Solution (ISIS∞) problem, the knowledge extractor outputs a solution vector that is only guaranteed to be times longer than the witness possessed by the prover. As a consequence, in many cryptographic schemes that use these proof systems as building blocks, there exists a gap between the hardness of solving the underlying ISIS ∞ problem and the hardness underlying the security reductions. In this paper, we generalize Stern's protocol to obtain two statistical zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge for the ISIS∞ problem that remove this gap. Our result yields the potential of relying on weaker security assumptions for various lattice-based cryptographic constructions. As applications of our proof system, we introduce a concurrently secure identity-based identification scheme based on the worst-case hardness SIVP Õ(n1.5) of the problem (in the ℓ2 norm) in general lattices in the random oracle model, and an efficient statistical zero-knowledge proof of plaintext knowledge with small constant gap factor for Regev's encryption scheme. © 2013 International Association for Cryptologic Research.
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CITATION STYLE
Ling, S., Nguyen, K., Stehlé, D., & Wang, H. (2013). Improved zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge for the ISIS problem, and applications. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 7778 LNCS, pp. 107–124). Springer Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-36362-7_8
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