Disclosure spillover from going-private activity

Abstract

Public firms that go private are no longer subject to SEC financial reporting requirements. This study examines peer firms' disclosure responses following the lost information spillover from going-private events. We first support the lost information transfer, finding evidence that analyst forecasts of peers' earnings are less accurate and more disperse and that peer liquidity is lower immediately following going-private transactions. In response, industry peers increase disclosure quality in mandatory filings. Peers that enhance disclosure regain some of the lost informational benefits. The disclosure response is most evident in firms that rely more on intra-industry information spillover, firms with lower competitive concerns, and firms with the greatest deteriorations in their information environments after going-private activity. Our study examines an underexplored aspect of going-private transactions—the loss of public disclosure—and finds that the lost information imposes a negative externality that prompts peers to increase self-disclosure to regain informational benefits.