Climate change, collective shocks, and intra-community cooperation: Evidence from a public good experiment with farmers and pastoralists

Abstract

Scholars and practitioners have long debated the effects of climate change on conflict, and more specifically on its precursors and constituent elements, such as (un)cooperative behavior. While harshening conditions linked to climate change carry collective risks that simultaneously affect whole communities and societies, the underlying conditions and responses might differ between groups and affect cooperative outcomes. In this paper, we explore whether collective and individual shocks undermine or enhance cooperation within farming and pastoral communities in the increasingly difficult conditions of the Sahel. We conducted a lab-in-the-field experiment based on a public good game in a farming area and pastoral area in Senegal. This study finds that (i) on average, pastoralists show higher levels of cooperation compared to farmers, (ii) overall, collective shocks decrease cooperation, while individual shocks increase cooperation, and (iii) effects of individual versus collective shocks are only significant for pastoralists but not for farmers. We suggest that individual shocks lead to more cooperation due to risk-sharing mechanisms, while collective shocks reduce cooperation due to risk aversion. Pastoralists’ higher cooperation levels may be attributed to lower market integration, stronger reliance on social and trading networks, and greater prior exposure to collective risks. These results suggest that risk perceptions and contextual factors, in addition to the nature of the shock, influence responses to climate change. Pastoral areas, while more vulnerable to collective shocks, may also have greater potential for public good provision, which could serve as a potential entry point for climate change adaptation.