Abstract
The privacy and security problems in RFID systems have been extensively studied. However, less research has been done on formal analysis of RFID security. The existing adversarial models proposed in the literature have limitations for analyzing RFID location privacy. In this paper, we propose a new formal proof model based on random oracle and indistinguishability. It not only considers passive/active attacks to the message flows between RFID reader and tag, but also takes into account physical attacks for disclosing tag's internal state, thus making it more suitable for real RFID systems. We further apply our model to analyze location privacy of an existing RFID protocol. © 2008 Springer Berlin Heidelberg.
Author supplied keywords
Cite
CITATION STYLE
Ha, J., Moon, S., Zhou, J., & Ha, J. (2008). A new formal proof model for RFID location privacy. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 5283 LNCS, pp. 267–281). Springer Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-88313-5_18
Register to see more suggestions
Mendeley helps you to discover research relevant for your work.
