Bankers closing idiosyncratic deals: Implications for organisational cynicism

Abstract

To better meet flexibility demands and increase person–job fit, organisations might offer their employees the opportunity to negotiate task-related arrangements, namely, idiosyncratic deals, referred to as “i-deals.” However, not every employee who requests an i-deal is successful in their negotiations. Thus, this study aims to further the knowledge of potential shortcomings of task-related i-deals and the role of supervisors in determining them. Drawing on social exchange theory, we hypothesise that low-quality supervisor–employee relationships (i.e., leader–member exchange) are more likely to result in unsuccessful task-related i-deal negotiations, which consequently might provoke increased organisational cynicism. We analysed three waves of data from 202 Swiss bankers who had requested task-related i-deals within the investigated business cycle. The results supported our hypothesis. Our findings highlight the role of supervisors in reducing the potential costs of using task-related i-deals as employee-initiated job design practices.