Xi Jinping in Command: Solving the Principal-Agent Problem in CCP-PLA Relations?

Abstract

The PLA has been a key player in Chinese elite politics since 1949. However, a series of developments over the last four years has prompted China watchers to re-evaluate Party-military relations. This paper argues that CCP-PLA relations in the Xi Jinping era are characterized by the centralization of power in a single civilian individual. This centralization is reflected by events such as a new emphasis on the CMC chairman responsibility system, the establishment of new coordination bodies under the top leader, radical reforms to the military command structure, the promotion of Xi's public image as the top leader, and large-scale personnel reshuffes during which Xi's trustees have gradually come to occupy key military posts while his rivals have been removed. For Xi, these measures are an antidote to the principal-agent problem in CCP-PLA relations caused by both information asymmetry and the discrepant interests of civilian leaders and the top brass of the PLA.