Logical epistemology, social evidence, and the a priori

Abstract

The ongoing debate in logical epistemology, particularly influenced by neo-Quinean perspectives such as logical anti-exceptionalism, has greatly advanced our understanding of logical knowledge. Recently, Martin and Hjortland introduced a refined taxonomy of logical anti-exceptionalism, distinguishing between two key approaches: methodological anti-exceptionalism and Quine’s evidential naturalism, which they term “evidential anti-exceptionalism”. This article critically examines their taxonomy, with a particular focus on their preferred account of methodological anti-exceptionalism, known as logical predictivism. Martin and Hjortland argue that methodological anti-exceptionalist accounts can preserve the apriority of logic while avoiding the exceptionalist commitments traditionally associated with logical epistemology. However, this article challenges that claim, arguing that predictivism’s reliance on empirical methods for developing and testing logical theories introduces a new methodological assumption – the practice-based approach – which ultimately undermines predictivism’s ability to account for the apriority of logic. Moreover, this critique extends to other accounts within the methodological anti-exceptionalist framework, showing that they, too, fail to account for the apriority of logic adequately.