Doppelte Kontingenz und reflexive Anthropologie

Abstract

Basically, sociology is grounded on two anthropological assumptions, which can be understood as the answers to the following two questions: "Who is a human being?" and "What is a human being?" The answer to the second question leads to a definition of the nature of human beings which can only be given in the framework of concrete social processes. This assumption is an anthropological one insofar as the undefined character of the relation of living beings to the environment is only ascribed to humans. The answer to the question as to who is a human being however, is generally presumed to be already known. This article suggests treating this question just like the question of the nature of human beings. The term "human being," therefore, is not understood in the sense of a "species being," but as a code for "being a person" or, in other words, as a code for the social conceived as "double contingency." The answer to the question of who is to be treated as a "human being" in this sense can then also be understood as changing throughout history. Central for an argument along these lines is a reinterpretation of Plessner's theory of "eccentric positionality," stating that with Plessner, anthropology's aim of defining what makes humans different from other species takes a reflexive turn. In this way anthropology is seen as only one possible way of closing the circle of individuals who exist socially. The answer to the question of who is a social actor/social person is not predetermined, but rather has to be reconstructed empirically.