David Hume and Adam Smith on Sympathy

Abstract

This article compares the two concepts of sympathy created by David Hume and Adam Smith. Although the notion plays a central role in both philosophical systems, its meaning is slightly different. Hume’s detailed epistemological analyzes make it possible to distinguish three planes of description in his philosophy: common-sense, mechanistic and phenomenalistic, with sympathy playing a different role in each of them. Smith saw the central importance of this concept in Hume’s concept of mind and sentiments and adopted it in his theory of moral feelings, but lacks a subtle analysis of the “mechanics” of human thought. This deficiency, however, can be treated both as neglect. However, on the other hand – paradoxically – it allows us to perceive the doctrinaire character of Hume’s concept resulting from the adoption of a physicalist model of the explication of human affectivity.