Securing the nuclear supply chain: Addressing the issue of counterfeiting

Abstract

In 2024, exploding pagers and walkie-talkies in Lebanon dramatically highlighted the importance of supply chain security and the risk that counterfeiting can pose. This article seeks to explore these issues in the nuclear context. Drawing on new empirical research, it examines how counterfeited materials, items, and technologies have found their way into nuclear supply chains and ultimately to facilities, exploring the impact of this and how the international community has responded. It finds that although counterfeits can and indeed have created significant nuclear risks, historically this issue has received relatively little attention. Here, a general lack of awareness, an overly narrow focus on their impact on critical safety systems, and the absence of comprehensive reporting mechanisms mean that the number of known counterfeits that have penetrated nuclear facilities globally is likely to be significantly underestimated. Although new international efforts in this area aimed at securing the nuclear supply chain have been launched in recent years, there remains much to be done, with considerable variation in the maturity of different countries and organizations’ approaches to this issue.