“Knowing what I don’t know”–belief in conspiracy theories relates to lower metacognitive sensitivity: a signal detection theoretic approach

Abstract

Beliefs in conspiracy theories are seemingly hard to dispute through facts. Researchers have partly attributed this resistance to certain information processing styles that are associated with conspiracy beliefs. Previous research therein has extensively examined the role of object-level information processing, for instance, intuitive (vs. analytic) thinking and cognitive reflection. However, research has so far has not considered that conspiracy beliefs might also be related to different ways of metacognitive information processing. In two studies, one sample from Germany, one quota-based sample from the US (total N = 1,231), we show that a generic belief in conspiracy theories as well as the belief in specific conspiracy theories such as those surrounding vaccinations and QAnon (but less so conspiracy mentality) is related to lower metacognitive sensitivity–i.e. a lower ability to accurately evaluate one’s knowledge. Results hold when controlling for object-level knowledge, cognitive reflection, and intuitive thinking.