Relative consistency and subjects' "theories" in domains such as naive physics: Common research difficulties illustrated by Cooke and Breedin

Abstract

While augmenting the literature with data that further exhibit context-specific responding to qualitative motion problems, Cooke and Breedin (1994) exhibit common theoretical and methodological difficulties that undermine their conclusions. Herein these flaws are explicated and con. trasted with features of studies that avoid the pitfalls of (2) theoretical vagueness, (2) overly coarse data aggregation, (3) nondiagnostic, errarful assessment items, and (4) imprecise measures of the variety of (mis/)conceptions (e.g., of "impetus," or inertia). The difficulties call into question Cooke and Breedin's claims that impetus ideas play minor roles in performance and that "naive theories" of motion are largely constructed on line. Because each confusion often arises from the polysemy of "theory," same empirical criteria for "theoryness" are discussed, including subjects' conceptual, temporal, and coherence-based consistencies (regarding researchers' models and isomorphs). While naive physics may be idiosyncratic, baroque, context-driven, and apparently inconsistent, it might (additionally) be based upon fairly a priori, systematic, and temporally stable information. © 1994 Psychonomic Society, Inc.