SUPPLY CHAIN COORDINATION CONSIDERING E-TAILER'S PROMOTION EFFORT AND LOGISTICS PROVIDER'S SERVICE EFFORT

Abstract

Promoting the sale of green agriculture products through online platforms has become the main focus of agricultural industries. In a supply chain consisting of an e-tailer and third-party logistics (TPL), both the promotion effort of the e-tailer and the logistics service effort of TPL can affect the demand. Considering that logistics service contracts may be provided by the e-tailer or TPL, this study defines two different timing sequences. Three types of contracts, i.e., fixed-price, revenue-sharing, and cost-sharing contracts, are used to coordinate the supply chain. The game models under different timing sequences and different contract scenarios are established and solved. The promotion effort and logistics service effort under different scenarios are compared theoretically and numerically. The results indicate that both the promotion effort and logistics service effort change with timing sequences and contract types. The timing sequences depending on the contract provider significantly affect the performance of the supply chain. The cost-sharing contract provided by the TPL can motivate the e-tailer to apply the largest effort, and vice versa. The cost-sharing contract provided by the e-tailer can achieve the largest demand that is optimal for both the e-tailer and supply chain. However, the optimal contract for the TPL is conditional.