Hospital side hustles: Funding conundrums and perverse incentives in Tanzania's publicly-funded health sector

Abstract

Following three decades of international financial institutions implementing austerity measures in sub-Saharan Africa, many health systems remain chronically underfinanced. During this period, countries like Tanzania have moved from a post-independence vision of a strong social sector providing free care for citizens, to a model of increased privatization of public health facilities, shifting the burden of self-financing to individual health facilities and the constituents they serve. Drawing on longitudinal ethnographic research and document analysis undertaken between 2008 and 2017 within three publicly-funded hospitals in north-central Tanzania, this article examines the actions and perspectives of administrators to explore how novel shifts towards semi-privatization of public facilities are perceived as taken-for-granted solutions to funding shortfalls. Specifically, hospital administrators used “side hustle” strategies of projectification and market-based income generating activities to narrow the gap between inadequate state financing and necessary recurrent expenditures. Examples from publicly-funded hospitals in Tanzania demonstrate that employing side hustles to address funding conundrums derives from perverse incentives: while these strategies are supposed to generate revenues to sustain or bolster services to poor clients, in practice these market-based approaches erode the ability of publicly-funded hospitals to meet their obligations to the poorest. These cases show that neoliberal ideas promoting health financing through public-private initiatives offer little opportunity in practice for strengthening health systems in low income countries, undermining those health systems' ability to achieve the goal of universal health care.